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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although our purpose below is to study some rather technical, 
metarecursion-theoretic questions raised by G. Kreisel, it is possible 
to give a sample of our principal construction in the familiar language of 
descriptive set theory. Let T be a member of 2UJ, and let .B be a lightface 
Al1 subset of 2W. We say T is generic with respect to 9 if there exists a 
hyperarithmetically encodable,r perfect closed subset P of 2U such that 
T E P and either P C .B or P C P ~ ./A. Corollary 3.5 provides a 17,lT 
such that T is generic with respect to every lightface d,l subset of 2UJ. 
The proof of 3.5 combines the methods of forcing [l] and priority 
[2, 31 (cf. Hinman [4]). The priority method is an essential tool for the 
construction of nontrivial, recursively enumerable sets. Its use in 3.5 
is appropriate for two reasons: T is a 17,l subset of w if and only if T 
is metarecursively enumerable; the forcing relation employed in it is 
metarecursively enumerable. Forcing with finite conditions will not 
suffice for the proof of this corollary. This last remark is made precise 
in 2.12, but for now consider the following intuitive argument. Suppose 
T is Cohen-generic; i.e. T is constructed by means of a forcing argument 
involving finite conditions and some ramified language 9 strong enough 
to define all the lightface Al1 sets. Then T will be generic with respect 
to all lightface Al1 sets in the sense of generic defined above. T will be 
infinite, since the collection of all finite sets is lightface Al1 but contains 
no perfect closed subset. Suppose T is nil; then T must contain some 
infinite hyperarithmetic set H. The set of all T’s containing H is lightface 
All, so the language -Y must have the power to express the fact that H is 
* The preparation of this paper \vas partially supported by C. S. Army Contract 
DAHCO 4-67-CO052. 
1 A closed subset P of 2w is said to be hyperarithmetically encodable if the set of all 
finite initial segments of members of P is hyperarithmetic. 
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a subset of T. Consequently, there must be some finite condition on T 
which forces H to be a subset of T. But no finite condition on T can 
force a fixed injnite set to be a subset of T. 
The second half of Section 2 describes the forcing relation needed 
in 3.5; the relation connects certain infinite, hyperarithmetic forcing 
conditions with sentences of recursive ordinal rank. The L7r1 set A 
constructed in the proof of 3.5 is the range of a metarecursive function 
from recursive wr into w. Thus A must be enumerated in a sequence 
of stages whose order-type is wr . Since A is a generic object, there 
must be an associated sequence of forcing conditions converging to A, 
whose order-type is recursive wi rather than the usual w. The fact that 
A is built in wr stages rather than w stages is the sole conceptual difficulty 
confronting the would-be reader of the proof of 3.5. This point is 
discussed further at the beginning of Section 3. 
Many of the results of metarecursion theory, and perhaps the theory 
itself, have their origin in Kreisel’s critique of a result of Spector [5]. 
Spector showed that all nonhyperarithmetic Lrrl sets occupied the same 
hyperdegree; he then interpreted his result as the solution of Post’s 
problem for L7i’ sets. Kreisel didn’t agree; he had an abundance of 
convincing arguments to support the view that flrl, subsets of w were 
analogous to recursively enumerable subsets of W, but he saw no good 
reason to think that hyperdegrees were analogous to Turing degrees. 
In particular, he did not accept the almost universally held contention 
of those early days that the hyperarithmetic subsets of w were analogous 
to the recursive subsets of w; moreover, he had rational reasons for not 
accepting it. He conjectured that “incomparable” JY7,l sets did exist, 
and subsequent mathematical events proved him right. 
It was shown in [6] that there exist two L7i1 subsets of w such that 
neither is metarecursive in the other. It was announced in [6] and [7] 
that there exist two 17,i sets such that neither is w,-computable from 
the other; the proof is given in Section 3. In the light of 2.3, it appears 
that 3.15 is the strongest possible “incomparability” result for U,l sets. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. It contains further results and open 
questions about IL7,’ subsets of w and countable admissible ordinals 
[9, 201. 
2. MACHINERY 
The first part of Section 2 is an attempt to make our paper as self- 
contained as possible without engaging in costly duplication. We repeat 
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some but not all of the definitions of [8, 6, 71 and none of the proofs. 
We recommend [8] to the reader seeking motivation for the definitions, 
and [7] to his more pragmatic brother in need of intuitive descriptions 
of those basic constructions which have proved useful. 
I,et wi be the least nonrecursive ordinal. Let @ be a function from 
wi into w1 ; @ is metarecursive if it can be computed according to the 
rules of Kripke’s equation calculus [9]. H is calculus is similar to Kleene’s 
[IO], but he adds an w-rule that makes infinite computations possible. 
For each Ix ( w1 , let T be a numeral for ~1. The primitive symbols of 
Kripke’s calculus are: function letters .f, g, h ,...; variables x, y, z ,...; 
numerals, successor (‘), equality (=), and a bounded existential 
quantifier (Ex<). If t, t,, ,..., t,[-i are terms, then variables, numerals, 
t’,.f(t” ,..., t,r-l), and (Ex c’ t,) ti(x) are terms. If t,, and t, are terms, 
then t,, = t, is an equation. The intended meaning of the equation 
(Es < t”) f&) = 0 
is: There is an x < t, such that ti(x) = 0. Similarly, the intended 
meaning of 
(Ex < to) t&v) = f 
is: There is no x < t, such that ti(x) = 0. 
Kripke’s first two computation rules are the standard substitution 
rules of Kleene [IO]. His third rule has two parts: 
(1) (Ex<&t(x)=O’ IS an immediate consequence of t(G) = 0, 
if I): < p; 
(2) (Ex < ,8) t(x) = i . is an immediate consequence of the set 
p(ti) = i 1 a < p). 
Let E be a finite set of equations. Kripke defines SE, the set of all 
equations metarecursively computable from E, by transfinite induction. 
SoE = E. If iy is an arbitrary ordinal >0, then SmE is the set of all 
immediate consequences of members or subsets of (J {SYE 1 y < a). 
SE = lJ (SeE 1 cy > O}. Clearly, SE = lJ {StiE 1 u countable), but more to 
the point, SE = (J {S,E i ai recursive). This particular result of Kripke 
implies that each equation c E SE can be computed via E by means of 
a computation which, when put in standard tree-form, has recursive 
ordinal height. It is routine to encode such a computation as a set of 
natural numbers. If the encoding is done in a standard fashion, then 
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each computation associated with SE will be encoded as a hyper- 
arithmetic set, and then the set of all such computations can be regarded 
as a 17,i set of indices of hyperarithmetic sets. 
Let @ be a function whose graph is a subset of wra. We say @ is 
partial metarecursive if there exists an E with principal function letter f 
such that 
for all a: < p < w1 . A set is metarecursively enumerable if it is the range 
of a partial metarecursive function. A function is metarecursive if it is 
partial metarecursive and its domain is all of wr . A set A is metarecursive 
if its characteristic function is metarecursive, or equivalently, if both A 
and wi - A are metarecursively enumerable. A set is metafinite if it is 
metarecursive and bounded (by some ordinal < wi). There exists a 
metarecursive indexing of the metafinite sets. Namely, there exist 
metarecursive functions j and k such that for each metafinite H there 
is a unique 6 such that 
H = {cd 1 j(S, a) = 0 & a < k(6)); 
if the above holds, then we write H = KS . 
The fundamental lemma of metarecursion theory is: If f is a meta- 
recursive function (hence total) and K is a metafinite set, then the range 
of f restricted to K is a metafinite set. It follows that the union of 
“metafinitely many” metafinite sets is metafinite. More precisely, if I is 
metafinite, then lJ {K, 1 6 E 1> is metafinite. 
PROPOSITION. 2.1 [8]. Let A _C w. A is metujnite t+ A is hypev- 
arithmetic. A is metarecursively enumerable f--f A is II,i. 
Let A and B be sets of recursive ordinals. We consider several ways 
of reducing A to B. A is weakly metarerursive in B (A <, B) if there 
are partial metarecursive functions Y and @ such that for all U, 
aE/f ++(Eff)(=)[y('(H,k',ol) = O&HCB&KCq ~ B], 
,~Att(EH)(EK)[~(H,k’,~) =O&HCB&KCwl-B], 
where H and K are variables ranging over the metafinite sets. Driscoll 
[ 1 l] showed that <, is not transitive! 
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Kripke’s definition of SE can be relativized to B c wr as follows. 
Let g be a function letter. Let 
if :Y is an arbitrary ordinal > 0, let Sf-‘,” be the set of all immediate 
consequences of members or subsets of lJ {SF.B ~ y _ _ L~j. SE.B = 
lJ [S,faB 1 ,X 3 0:. Clearly, 
S’.B == u {SF.” 1 u countable). 
More to the point, there is a least countable ordinal wB such that 
If B is metarecursive, then wE = wr . If B C w, then wB =y wlR = the 
least ordinal not recursive in B. Thus if B C w and B is a nonhyper- 
arithmetic D7,1 set, then wB > wr . On the other hand there does exist 
a nonmetarecursive, metarecursively enumerable B such that wB = wr 
[61. 
Each equation e E S”.B can be computed from B via E by means of 
a computation c which, when put in standard tree-form, has ordinal 
height < UP. If the standard encoding of c as a subset of w is hyper- 
arithmetic, then we say c is metafinite. If a computation is metafinite, 
then its ordinal height < wi , but not conversely. 
Let SE*B.ln be the set of all members of SE.B computed from B via E 
by means of metafinite computations. A is metajinitely computaOle from 
B (A en,, B) if there exists an E with principal function letter f such 
that 
for all N ( wr . 
THEOREM 2.2 [6]. d <,, B t--f A <,,,r B. 
For each ordinal 8, A is S-computable from B (A & B) if there exists 
an E with principal function letter f such that 
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for all LY < wr . If A <,1,, B, then B <,, B, but not conversely. It can 
be shown that <,,,, is not transitive. 
PROPOSITION 2.3. Let A and B be IIll subsets of CO. If B is not 
hyperarithmetic and 6 > w1 , then A es B. 
Proof. In the formalism of Kripke’s equation calculus, rewrite 
Spector’s proof [5] that any two nonhyperarithmetic f17,1 sets have the 
same hyperdegree. Utilize Kleene’s result [ 121 that every Ull set is one- 
one reducible to 0. 
By 2.3 the strongest instance of “incomparability” possible for 
n,i subsets of w is a pair of n,r sets such that neither is w,-computable 
from the other. This possibility is realized in Section 3. One obvious 
source of difficulty in the study of w,-computability is the presence of 
nonmetafinite computations of recursive ordinal height. The notion of 
w,-subgenericity [6] enables us to avoid a direct confrontation with 
nonmetafinite computations. Let B be a subset of q . B is w,-subgeneric 
if there exists a metarecursive function t such that for every equation e 
and every finite system of equations E, 
PROPOSITION 2.4. If A <,, B and B is w,-subgeneric, then A <, B. 
THEOREM 2.5. If A <,, B and B is w,-subgeneric, then A is wl- 
subgeneric. 
2.4 is an immediate consequence of 2.2. Since we have no need of 2.5 
in this paper, we save its proof for [13]. 
The remainder of Section 2 is an exposition of the forcing relation 
needed in Section 3 to construct an w,-subgeneric, nonhyperarithmetic 
17,l subset of w. 
We define a ramified analytic language y0J.9-) similar to that 
employed by Feferman [14]. The primitive symbols of ZU1(9) are: 
number variables x, y, z ,...; finite numerals 0, 1, 2 ,...; unranked set 
variables x’, Y, Z,...; for each recursive ordinal LY, ranked set variables 
Xx ye zll ; predicates E and =; functions +, ., and ’ (successor); 
and a skt cknstant r. 9 is said to be a rankedformula if every set variable 
occurring in 9 is ranked; in that case the ordinal rank of 9 is the least 
ordinal y such that y > p for every quantifier (EXa) occuring in 9 and 
such that y 3 6 for every variable ,ris occurring freely in 9. A formula 
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is existential if it is ranked or of it is of the form (EX).F, where .F is 
ranked. 
Let T be an arbitrary subset of w. We simultaneously inductively 
define the structure .,,&(T) and truth in the chain of structures 
(J {d,j( T) / 6 < al f or each recursive ordinal X. 
(A) Let 9 be a sentence of rank <I. Then .% is true in 
U$i&(T)Ip <E: if F is true under the following interpretation: 
Each quantified set variable X3 occurring in .F is restricted to :H8(T); 
each number variable x is restricted to w; .Y denotes 7’. 
(B) Let Y(X) b e a formula of rank < LY whose sole free variable 
is X. Let G be the set of all n such that 3(~) is true in (J [%HB(T) p -1 ~1. 
Then ./i’,(T) is the set of all G’s thus obtained. 
Let .&(T) = u (AYl( T) 1 ,I < w rj. Let 9 be an arbitrary sentence 
of ZU,(X). Then 9 is true in / 4’(T) (,/Gp( T) = 3) if .F is true when 
each quantified, unranked set variable X is restricted to =fl’( 7’) and the 
remaining symbols of F are interpreted as in clause (A) above. It will 
be convenient to use an abstraction symbol 2 in the following standard 
fashion. I,et Y(X) be as in clause (B) above; then M(x) will denote the 
set G. If t is a number theoretic term, then t E M(X) is equivalent 
to Y(t). 
It is routine to assign recursive ordinals as Godel numbers to the 
formulas of 9O,,(.YJ with the following consequences: the set of Godel 
numbers of existential formulas is metarecursive; the predicate “iy is 
the Godel number of a formula of rank /3” is metarecursive; for each p, 
the set of Godel numbers of formulas of rank <p is metafinite. 
A coinfinite forcing condition P is a pair (Pt, Pp) of disjoint subsets 
of w such that w - (P+ u Pp) is infinite. Coinfinite forcing conditions 
have been used by Silver [ I.51 in the context of the set theory to define 
a new kind of generic set with interesting properties. P is said to be 
metafinite if P = (P+, P-) and P+ and Pp are metafinite. Metafinite P’s 
were employed in the proof of Theorem 2 of [6]. 
P, Q, R... will denote metafinite, coinfinite forcing conditions. 
T E P means that P = (Pi-, Pp), PT C T, and Pp C w - T. 
P1Q means (T)(TEQ+ TEP). 
We define a forcing relation, P ,+ R, where 5 is a sentence of 
z,,,(Y). The ranked sentences are treated as in [ 161: 
(1) Pe 3 if F is ranked and (T)[TeP+,H(T)/= ,F]. 
(2) P I+ (Ex) F(X) if F(* ) r* is unranked and P k g(n) for some n. 
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(3) P k (EXx) 9(x”) if 9(LP) is unranked and P tj- 9(@(x)) 
for some 9(z) of rank <a whose sole free variable is x. 
(4) P & (EX) 9(X) if P k (EX”) S(Xe) for some 01. 
(5) P&F&& if 9&B is unranked, P k 9, and P H- 9. 
(6) P & -9 if 9 is unranked and (Q),,, - [Q K $1. 
LEMMA 2.6. The relation P k 9, restricted to existential F’s, is 
metarecursiuely enumerable. 
Proof. By clause (4) of the definition of K, it is sufficient to show 
P # 9, restricted to ranked F’s, is metarecursively enumerablea. 
There exists a III1 set I C w such that {Pi 1 i ~1) is an enumeration 
of all P’s; in addition, there is an arithmetical formula A(T, i) such that 
for all T and all i E I, 
T 6 Pi t) A( T, i). 
Similarly, there exists a III1 set J C w such that {.Pj 1 j E J} is an 
enumeration of all ranked .9’s; in addition, there is a III1 formula K( T, j) 
such that for all T and all j E J, 
The existence of K follows from the fact that AZ’(T) + 9 was defined 
for ranked 9 inductively by means of arithmetical closure conditions. 
Let V(i, j) be the formula 
(T)[A(T, 9 - K(T,j)l. 
Then for all i E I and j E J, P if 9i if and only if V(i, j). Since V(i, j) is 
1111, the lemma follows from 2.1. 
P is said to weakly force 9 (P K * 9) if (Q)P,0(ER)Q3R[R k F]. - 
LEMMA 2.7. Let F be existential, let P + * .F, and let k be a finite 
subset of w - (P+ u P-). Then there exists a Q C P such that Q K .F 
and k is a jinite subset of w - (Q+ u QJ. 
Proof. For the sake of clarity assume k = {m}. Choose Q,, so that 
PJQzo, mEQ,+, and Q. + 5. Clearly, P I (Q,,+ - (m}, Q,- u {ml). 
Choose Q, C (Q,) + ~ (m}, Qzo- u (m}) so that Q, k 9. 
2 Would a more intricate argument show that the relation P + 5, restricted to ranked 
9’s, is metarecursive ? 
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Let Q+ = Qi+ and Q- = Qi- - {m>. Clearly, P 2 Q, m $ Q+ u Q-, 
and 
for all T. Since 9 is existential, Q K 9. If k has ?z elements, the above 
construction is inflated so as to include definitions of Qi for all i < 2”. 
LEMMA 2.8. Let (3$ 1 i < w} be a metafinite sequence of existential 
sentences. Suppose 
Then (ER)P3R(i)[R k FJ. 
Proof. By 2.6 and 2.7 there exist partial metarecursive functions 
R,, and t(n) defined for all n < w such that: 
R, = P; 
t(n) = pm[m 6 R,+ v R,- & (+<Jrn > t(i))]; 
R 2 R,+l, Rn+l H- ,%A 
Wi<:n[W 4 R;,, u R,+,l. 
Let R+ = (J (R,+ 1 n < wj and R- = (J (R,- 1 n < w}. Then R is 
a coinfinite forcing condition, since (i)(t(i) 4 Rf u R-). And R t+ ,Fn , 
since R C R,,, i and R,+, # F,, . 
LEMMA 2.9. (P)(F)(EQ),,,[Q k 9 or Q # wF]. 
Proof. It suffices to consider ranked 9’s. It is routine to define a 
concept of rank for a ranked formula 9 which takes into account both 
the ordinal rank of 9 and the number of logical symbols in F, and which 
has the following natural property: if (EP) X(s) is a ranked sentence 
and if 9(x) is a ranked formula of ordinal rank <u, then X(2%(x)) has 
lower rank than (EP) .YF(~V). The lemma is proved by induction on 
the rank of F. Let .9 be (EXR) ,X(P). If there is a Q C P and 59(x) of 
ordinal rank <a such that Q k ~~(W(x)), then all is well. Suppose not! 
Let (%Jx) / i < W} be a metafinite enumeration of all formulas of 
ordinal rank <a whose sole free variable is X. By the induction 
hypothesis, 
607/7!1-5 
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By 2.8 there is an R C P such that R K - cW(C~‘~(X)) for all i < W. 
But then R k -(EX’U) 9(X*). 
Let F be a sentence of gCW1(F). T is said to be generic with respect to 
S if for some P: T E P, and P k 9 or P & -9. T is generic if T is 
generic with respect to every sentence 9”. By 2.9, generic T’s exist. If T 
is generic, then a routine argument shows: ,4(T) + F if and only if 
there is a P such that T E P and P k F. It can be shown with the help 
of 2.8 that if T is generic, then err = w, . 
LEMMA 2.10. Let T be a subset of w. Then (i) is equivalent to (ii), 
and (ii) implies (iii). 
(i) T is w,-subgeneric and not hyperarithmetic. 
(ii) T is generic with respect to all ranked sentences of YwI(.Y). 
(iii) T is generic with respect to all lightface Al1 subsets of 2W. 
Proof. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) follows from the equivalence 
of two formalisms. The first formalism is concerned with computations 
of recursive ordinal height, the second with ranked sentences of .=5$(Y). 
Let E be a finite system of equations in Kripke’s equation calculus, let 
B be an arbitrary subset of W, let e be an equation, and let 01 be a recursive 
ordinal greater than every ordinal occurring in E or e. Then there exists 
a ranked sentence Ff,e such that 
for al B; furthermore, Ff,e is a metarecursive function of E, N, and e. 
Ff, is of course defined by recursion on LX; the details of the recursion 
are’similar to those encountered in Kleene’s proof [ 171 of the equivalence 
of the hyperarithmetic sets and the ramified analytic sets of recursive 
ordinal rank. The ordinal rank of Ff,,e will be approximately 01. 
Let 9 be a ranked sentence. Then there exist E(F), e(g), and a(F) 
such that 
for all B. 
E(9), e(F), and a(.F) are metarecursive functions of 9. It is natural 
to require that 
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for all recursive y > Lo, since 
for all y greater than the ordinal rank of .F. 
Fix T and suppose that T is w,-subgeneric but not hyperarithmetic, 
and that A’(T) /= 9, where .F is a ranked sentence. We need a P such 
that T E P and P t+ 5. IYe have 
Since T is w,-subgeneric, there is a metarecursive t such that 
for some recursive y. Then there is pair of metafinite subsets of w, 
H and K, such that H C T, K C w  - T, and 
for all B such that H C B and K C w - B. P = (H, K) is a coinfinite 
condition, because T E P and T is not hyperarithmetic. Clearly, P + 9. 
Now suppose T is generic with respect to the ranked sentences 
of 22Q9). First we check that T is not hyperarithmetic. Suppose 
T = H, where H is hyperarithmetic. There exists a ranked formula 
X(X) such that for all B, 
B = H f-f d(B) + -3- = .W(.X).~ 
So there must be a P such that T E P and P k Y = a%(x). But then 
(T)( T E P + T = H), an impossibility! 
Fix E. We need a metarecursive function t such that 
for all e and E. We have 
a The existence of X(r) is implicit in Kleene [17]. 
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The relation P K Sf’- is (by 2.6) metarecursively enumerable in P, E, IY. 
and e. t(E) is a finite system of equations strong enough to enumerate 
the relation P if FE% . In addition, t(E) has the property that e is 
computable from T via t(E) if and only if there is a P such that T E P 
and P # Ff,e . 
Finally, we observe that (ii) + (iii). This follows immediately from 
the fact that if 8 is a lightface AI1 subset of 20, then there is a ranked 
sentence 9 of DLpI(.9) such that 
for all T. 
This is proved, not by induction on the recursive ordinals, but by a direct 
argument involving Brouwer-Kleene trees (cf. Rogers [12, p. 454, 
16-851). 
Let A and B be subsets of w. We say A is Zll in B over recursive w1 
if there exists an existential formula C!?(X) such that 
?zEA ++JqB) + s(n) 
for all n. We say A is d,l in B over recursive w1 if both A and w - A 
are ZI1 in B over recursive o1 . 
THEOREM 2.11. Let A and B be subsets of w. 
(i) If A is d,l in B over recursive w1 , then A &,, B. 
(ii) If B is w,-subgeneric and A <,, B, then A is Al1 in B over 
recursive w1 . 
Proof. The proof of (i) is similar to that of 2.10; we save it for [13], 
since it is not needed in Section 3. The proof of (ii) is obtained by adding 
one more fact to the proof of 2.10. Let J be an arbitrary 17r1 subset of w. 
Then J is Er’ over the hyperarithmetic sets [ 121. Thus there is an 
existential formula (EY) 3(x, Y) of sU,(.F) (such that 9(x, Y) contains 
no unranked bound variables) with the property that 
n.EJWAf + (EY)2qn, Y) 
for all n (=A! = the set of all hyperarithmetic sets = A%‘(T) for any 
hyperarithmetic T). 
We claim that 
71 E J- JiqB) + (EY) qfi, Y) 
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for all w,-subgeneric B. If B is hyperarithmetic, then A&(B) = I K. 
Suppose B is not hyperarithmetic; then B is generic with respect to all 
ranked sentences of FU,(5) by 2.10. If II E J, then .X(B) /= (EY) 9(%, Y) 
because ..&! C k’(B). Suppose .&i!(B) + (EY) %(ti, Y). Then for some 
metafinite P: B E P and P K (EY) y(fi, Y). There exists a hyper- 
arithmetic T E P; .,t’/( T) =- ..A?‘, and 
47’) + (EL’) qn, I-), 
so n E J. 
Let A <,, B. It suffices to show that A is Z,’ in B over recursive wi . 
Since B is w,-subgeneric, there is a finite system E of equations such 
that A is computable from B via E and metafinite computations only. 
Letfbe the principal function letter of E; let e,l be the equationf(n) = 0. 
Thus 
Let D be a typical metafinite computation that puts err in Sf*B*m for 
some 01 < wi . Clearly D draws only upon a metafinite set of membership 
facts about B. Thus there are metafinite sets HD and KD such that 
e,, E S:,T,m for erlery T such that HD C T and KD C w - T. 
It is routine to use notations for recursive ordinals as Giidel numbers 
of metafinite computations so that the relation 
J(n, d) : a’ is the Giidel number of a metafinite computation of e,, via E 
is 17,‘. In addition, there are arithmetic predicates X((d, X) and .X(d, X) 
such that 
J(n, d) - H” = .W(d, x) & K” = 2f(d, s), 
for all n and d [ 12, p. 456, 166981. Let (EY) ‘3(x0 , x1 , Y) be an existential 
formula of 9(,X) such that 
/(n, d) + -+ JqB) ‘F (EY) qn, d, I’) 
for all n and d. Let 0(x,) be 
(Ex,)[(EY) Ii+” ) x1 , Y) & (x)(2qx1 ) x) - N E F) & (x)(.X(.r, ) ‘X) + .x I$ q. 
Then Q(x(,) is existential, and for each n, 
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Feferman [14] studied Cohen-forcing in the context of 5$,(,Y). 
Let P, q, r .*. be finite consistent conjunctions of formulas of the form: 
nt E Y, E $9. Then p & 9 was defined by Feferman by induction on 
the recursive ordinals in a fashion analogous to Cohen’s original definition 
of k. T is Cohen-generic with respect to the sentence 9 of Y+(.Y) if 
there is a p satisfied by T such that p K 9 or p k ,%9. 
PROPOSITION 2.12. If T is Cohen-generic with respect to all ranked 
sentences of L&(F), then T is not II,l. 
Proof. Let T be I7,l and Cohen-generic with respect to all ranked 
sentences. T must be infinite, since no finite condition can force T to be 
finite. But then T must contain an infinite hyperarithmetic set, let us 
say, H. Let 9(x) be a ranked formula such that 
for all n and all T. There must be a p such that T satisfies p and 
p # (x)[X(x) + x E 91. This last is impossible; simply choose an n 
not mentioned in p and belonging to H. Then p & n $ F + .X(K) & 
fig .P. 
Proposition 2.12 should be compared with Theorem 3.4. The 
comparison highlights certain differences between various forcing 
relations on recursive w1 that we plan to explore further in [13]. For 
example, we can show there is a T, Cohen-generic with respect to all 
ranked sentences of ZQ.F), such that T has the same hyperdegree as 
Kleene’s 0. 
3. CONSTRUCTIONS 
We begin with a preliminary construction in the hope of clarifying 
the principal technical device employed in the main construction. The 
preliminary construction provides a 17,lA C w such that A is generic 
with respect to all ranked sentences of YW,(G’). The main construction 
provides a pair of I7,l sets which are A,‘-incomparable over recursive 
w1 . As we hinted in the introduction, a peculiar problem arises when 
one attempts to metarecursively enumerate exotic 17r1 sets by imitating 
certain exotic recursive enumerations. Since a 17r1A C w is meta- 
recursively enumerated in w1 many steps, there must be an intermediate 
stage (T > w of the enumeration by which infinitely much of A (call 
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it Au) has been enumerated. If we are overly generous in putting numbers 
into A, then at some stage u x wi , w - Au will be finite. So we must 
take precautions that guarantee that w ~ An is infinite for every u C. w1 ; 
the k function below is designed to retard the growth of A. 
Let f be a function from wi into wi . We say f  changes jinitely ofterl 
below u (u < wl) if 
is finite. We say f changes finitely often if f changes finitely often below 
w1 . Note that if f is metarecursive and changes finitely often below 0 
for every 0 > wi , then f changes finitely often. If f changes finitely 
often below u(u < wi), then 
where y is such that f(8) = f (u), whenever 0 > 6 > v. 
Let p be a one-one metarecursive function from wi into CO. Let 
{S, 1 6 < wi] be a metarecursive enumeration of all ranked sentences 
of YO,,(CY). We say -;*7, is well-dejined and equal to 8, at stage CJ if 
(ES)(S < u&p(S) - n); F,, ( n C. UJ) is called a partial metarecursive 
enumeration of ranked sentences. We define three metarecursive 
functions, P(,, n), k(o, TL) and Aa, for all u < wi and all 12 cc w by 
recursion on CT. If n is well-defined at stage (T, then our aim is to define 
a coinfinite forcing condition P(u, n) f @” and an A0 such that 
and AU satisfies P(u, rz). We also aim to define k(u, nz) so that 
{k(u, m) / m < w, ’ - (Au u P(u, np> is infinite for all x Thus k(o, m) 
will be a witness to two important facts at the end of stage O: 
(1) w - Aa is infinite; 
(2) (AU, P(u, n-) is a coinfinite forcing condition. 
If (I) is false, then there is no point in continuing the enumeration of A. 
Suppose (2) were false. Then we might find ourselves in the following 
unfortunate position: ,Fr, and ,FrL+i are well-defined at stage o; 
PC,, n) tk z, ; it is not the case that either P(u, n + 1) w -F7,+i or 
P(u, n + 1) + m.F,+i ; Am satisfies P(u, n); Am U P(u, a)) is cofinite. 
J @ denotes both the trivial forcing condition satisfied by all T and the empty set. 
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The natural thing to do at stage (T + 1 is to use Lemma 2.9 to define 
P(u + 1, n + 1) so that either 
and so that P(u + 1, n + l)+ 2 Au. However, we also want to preserve 
the fact that A0 satisfies P(o, n), since P(u, FZ) k -Fn and since we intend 
to give sPb higher priority than Prt+i . This can be done only if 
P(u + 1, n + l)+ n P(u, n)- = @. But then the natural use of Lemma 
2.9 would be to provide a P(=P(u + 1, n f 1)) such that either 
p tk eL+1 or P H- ~Fj+i and such that Pf > A0 and P- > P(o, HP; 
there is no hope of finding such a P, since (AU, P(u, E))) is not a cofinite 
forcing condition. 
Stage u = 0. P(0, n) = @, k(0, a) = n, A0 = CD. 
Stage o = h = limit ordinal. If P(8, n) has changed finitely often 
below A, then 
P(h, n) = lim{P(G, ?z) 1 S < A)-; 
otherwise P(h, n) = P(0, n). Define R(0, n) similarly. AA = (J (A* i 6 <. A;. 
Stage u = IY + 1. Let n, be the least n such that 3$, is well-defined, 
P(m, n) = @‘, and 
pa” = (A’, (J {{k(cY, m)) u P(a, m)- J 112 < n,) 
is a coinfinite condition. (If no such n exists, then all values at stage 
u = UI + 1 are the same as those at stage e.) By 2.9 there is a P # @ 
such that Q? > P and either P k %,,, or P K -3yt ; let P(n, , u) 
be the first such P occuring in the standard metarecurske enumeration 
of K provided by 2.6. Let A0 = P(u, n,)+ -Z Ax. 
Define k(u, n) so that 
and 
(k(u, m) ) m > n,} C w - (Au U P(0, n$). 
ON THE REDUCIBILITY OF flll SETS 73 
LEMMA 3.1. For each n, the fllnctions P(u, n) and k(u, n) change 
only jnitely often. 
Proof. Let n* be the least n such that P(u, a) changes infinitely 
often. Let X* be the least limit ordinal X < wr such that P(u, n*) 
changes infinitely often below X. *\s o approaches X*, the value of 
P(u, E*) alternates infinitely often between the trivial value @ and 
various nontrivial values. There must be infinitely many 31 s< X* such 
that P(N, n*) is nontrivial and P(I + 1, 72”) = @‘; for every such #I’, 
n, -c IZ*. But then P(u, HZ) changes infinitely often below h* for some 
m x-’ n*. If k(u, ~2) changes infinitely often, then P(u, m) changes 
infinitely often for some m < II. 
LEMMA 3.2. k(u, i) $ A0 u P(u, m)- for all i 3 m and all u. 
Proof. By induction on O. Suppose 5 = IY $- 1 and n, is defined. 
Clearly, k(a, i) $ izD u P(u, m)- for i 3 m > rz,, . P(u, m)- 2 P(u, n,,)-- 
for m < II, , so k(u, z) $ AU u P(u, ~22)) for i 3 tz, > m. By the inductive 
hypothesis, 
k(u, i) $ ,-P u P(u, m) 
for nrr > i 3 m. And happily, k(o, i) $ AU for n, > i. 
Suppose u = h = limit ordinal; apply 3.1. 
LEMMA 3.3. (A”, (J [P( u, m)-- 1 m < n)) is a coinjinite condition for 
all u and all n. 
Proof. First observe by induction on G that A0 n P(u, m)- = @ 
and k(u, m) < k(a, m + 1) for all m; then apply 3.2. 
'I'HEOREM 3.4. There exists a IIllA generic with respect to all ranked 
sentences of .YU,,(t!). 
Proof. Let A =: U {n1° 1 u < wi), where A0 is defined above. A is 
17i1, thanks to 2.1. Let 9 be a ranked sentence of gU,(G’). Let n be such 
that ~3, is well-defined and equal to 9 for all sufficiently large u. By 3.1 
PZ, 3 ?z for all sufficiently large R. Then by 3.2 and 3.3, P(u, n) # CD 
for arbitrarily large U. 
By 3.1 
P(R) = lim{P(o, z) 1 0 < 0~~) 
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exists. Since P(n) # @, P(n) # s?, or P(n) k -,9$ ; and A > P(a)+-. 
By 3.3, w - A0 3 P(n)) for all sufficiently large U, so A satisfies P(n). 
COROLLARY 3.5. There exists a III1 subset of w generic with respect 
to every lightface Al1 subset of 2W. 
COROLLARY 3.6. There exists a nonhyperarithmetic, w,-subgeneric IIll 
subset of CO. 
Corollaries 3.5 and 3.6 are consequences of 2.10. Now we undertake 
some modifications of the construction underlying 3.4 in the hope of 
obtaining two nil subsets of w, each generic with respect to all ranked 
sentences of YO,,(Q’), neither Al1 in the other over recursive wi . Let 
9,1a (YZ < W) be the partial metarecursive enumeration Fn(n < W) of 
ranked sentences of 9”,JG’) used in 3.4. Let ,F?,B (U B W) be an isomorphic 
enumeration of the ranked sentences of TO,J,#). Let 9,,“(x) (n <’ w) 
be a partial metarecursive enumeration of all ,Z’,i formulas of Y0,,(f7) 
whose sole free variable is X; thus for each Zi’ formula of Z0,,(C7) of the 
form 9(x), there exists an n e:’ w such that Y,1.4(~) is well-defined and 
equal to 9(x) for all sufficiently large 0. Let %,?B(~) (n c OJ) be an 
isomorphic enumeration of ,Z’,l formulas of x,,J.#). (Zr’ = existential.) 
We define eight metarecursive functions, P.P-4(u, n), P,/(o, n), k”(o, n), 
Au, qpB(u, n), PIGB(u, n), kB(u, n), and BU, for all u <’ wr and all IZ ~1 w 
by recursion on cr. P,- A and k” bear the same relation to A0 that P and k 
bear to Aa in 3.4; the same holds for P~FB, kB, and BO. 
Suppose gr,“(~y) is well-defined for all sufficiently large 0. Then 
we try to control the course of events so that ,-1 satisfies P,/(u, n), 
kB(a, n) E B,J and P/(a, a) + ~;qkB(a, n)) 
If we succeed, then w - B will not be Zrl in A over recursive wi via 
%?&A. If we fail, all is not lost since we also try to achieve 
kB(o, n) $ BU and d(A) + -!grl.4(kB(a, n)). 
The genericity of A with respect to ranked sentences is essential, since 
it guarantees that either 
W14d’ tt ~nA(kB(a, n))l or .d(A) + -YnA(kB(u, n)). 
In a symmetrical fashion we strive to make w - A not ,Z’,l in B over 
recursive wi . The usual Friedbergian conflict results from our simul- 
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taneous attempts to make A and B “incomparable”, and is resolved 
by the usual priorities. But there is an additional conflict also resolved 
by priorities. Our attempts to make A and B generic will interfere with 
our attempts to make A and B “incomparable”. In ordinary recursion 
theory this problem cannot occur, since the finiteness of ordinary 
computations compels every set to be generic. 
Stage u = 0. P/(0, z) = P&O, n) = P,,“(O, 12) = P,,.‘(O, H) ~ @, 
P(O, n) = P(O, n) = II, do : B” = @. 
Stage u = X = limit ordinal. If YFA(S, H) has changed finitely often 
below A, then 
P,-.‘(h, n) = lim{P#(6, n) / 6 < Xi; 
otherwise P,,A(h, n) = PFA(O, n). Define P,.“(A, n), qFE(h, n), P,,,,“(A, z), 
k”(X, n), and P(h, ~1) similarly. A” = (J [A” ~ S < A); B” = u [B” , 6 c: A). 
Stage u = il: + 1. If CJ G i(mod 4), go to case i. 
Case 0. Let II,, be the least II such that 37,” is well-defined, 
PFA(ti, ~2) = @, and such that 
is a coinfinite condition. (If no such 11 exists, then all values at stage 
CJ = iy. $ 1 are the same as those at stage a.) By 2.9 there is a P # @ 
such that AQaR > P, and either P + ,9:X or P k -,F$&. Let P.FA(a, n,) 
be the first such P in the enumeration of p provided by 2.6. The only 
other changes to be made in passing from stage :Y to stage u = 2 + I are 
A0 = P,/(a, n,>+ 2 A*; kA(a, m) (m 3 IZ,,) is defined so that 
lqo, i) < /+a, VI) < k“(U, 111 $ 1) for i < n,, < w7, 
and 
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Case 1. Let rniA be the least n such that g,,“(x) is well-defined, 
PFA(cx, a) = @, and for some y < 01, 
Au satisfies P, , w - (Ax U PY-) is infinite, 
p, # @, P, + Yn.4(@(% n)), 
(4n< ,[PT”(% 4 1 PJ, 
(4,n<,[PFA(% m) 2 PA. 
Let the first such P, be PYA(a, rwA). (If Y, A is not defined, then all values 
at stage u equal those at stage CX.) The only other changes are 
I+ = Btx u {&‘(a, rwA)}; 
P9B(u, m) = P:/(a, m) = P/(a, m) = P!/(% m) = @ 
kB(o, m) = P(cx, m + 1) for m > rlA; 
for m > * .A. ? ) 
Au = A*; kA(u, m) (m > r,,A) is defined so that 
and 
kA(a, i) < k”(o, m) < P(u, m + I) for i (I n, f  m, 
{P(u, m) 1 m > rOA} C w - (Au U PYq,4(u, yeA)--). 
Case 2. Same as Case 0 with A replaced by B throughout. 
Case 3. Same as Case 1 with A and B interchanged throughout 
save for one asymmetry. The equation P,/(o, m) = @ (m > rYA) of 
Case 1 becomes 
P!/(U, m) = @ for m > run. 
LEMMA 3.7. For each n, the functions P,/(u, n), P,/(u, n), kA(u, n), 
PFB(u, n), P/(a, n), and kB(u, n) change only finitely often. 
Proof. Similar to the Friedbergian argument of 3.1. 
LEMMA 3JA. (u)(m)[Wu, m) < kA(u, m + I)]. 
Proof. By induction on u. When u = h = limit ordinal, apply 3.7. 
LEMMA 3.9*. kA(u, i) 4 Au u PFA( U, m)- U PcCA(u, m)- for all i 3 m 
and all u. 
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Proof, By induction on g. Suppose u -= Y {-- 1 -i O(mod 4) and n, 
is defined. If i > m > n, or i 3 11, > m, then the definitions made 
at stage o insure that all is well; note that 
for all M ~‘1 E, . If n,, > i > m, then the inductive hypothesis is needed. 
Suppose 0 7 :x + 1 K I(mod 4) and r,,* is defined. If i > PZ > Y,;~ 
or i >, r,* > nz, then all goes smoothly, since 
P~~q~, n-z- u ?/(a, m)- c I’q’(a, Y,,.“) 
for all wz < yeA. If ?,,A > i 2 m, then the inductive hypothesis and 
Lemma 3.8* are invoked. 
If G = ,N + 1 _- 3 (mod 4), then the inductive hypothesis suffices. 
If G = A 1 limit ordinal, then an application of 1,emma 3.7 is required. 
LEMMA 3. IO*. (AU, IJ ;-P,,-“( U, m- U P,q,4(u, m)- 1 m c., n;) is a 
coinfinite condition for all m and CT. 
Proof. First observe by induction on D that Aa n (PFA(~, m)- U 
I’,,,“(,, m)-) = @ for all m and CJ. Then apply 3.8,’ and 3.9”. 
I,EMMA 3. I I*. For each m, A satisjies P,/(u, m) a?zd P&a, m) 
fey all suficiently large C. 
Proof. First observe by induction on 0 that qFA(a, m)+ U 
PrG,A(~, m) + C Au for all m and CT. Then apply 3.7 and 3. IO*. 
LEMMA 3.12”. A is generic with respect to all ranked sentences of 
14&q. 
Proof. Similar to 3.4. Replace 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 by 3.7, 3.9”, and 
3.1OA. 
Lemma 3.13” isolates the principal information needed in 3.14 to 
establish the d,l-incomparability of il and B over wi . There is a curious 
twist in the proof of 3.13 *. Its very statement makes clear that the 
genericity of A (supplied by 3.12*) will be needed for its proof. What is 
less clear is the reason why in the middle of the proof of 3.13* it is 
necessary to note that A is not hyperarithmetic. Thus the proof of the 
nil-incomparability of il and B over recursive w1 has to be preceded 
by a proof that neither A nor B is hyperarithmetic. As far as vve can tell, 
78 SACKS 
this phenomenon has no counterpart in the theory of recursively 
enumerable subsets of w. We hope to discuss it further in [13]. 
By 3.7 it is legitimite to define 
for all n. 
kB(n) = lim{P(cr, n) / 0 < wi]-, 
Pcq,4(n) = lim{P9,4(o, n) 0 < wij, 
LEMMA 3.13A. If 3,r,“(x) is well-dejined, and ;f ;&‘(A) ‘+ 9,,d(kB(n)), 
then PcgA(n) # @. 
Proof. Fix n. We intend to show that there exist arbitrarily large a 
such that either PCqA(q n) = @ or P#(u + 1, n) # @. Since 
M(A) k 9?,,A(kB(n)), it f o 11 ows from 3. 12A that for some Q f @ and 
satisfied by A, 
Q K zJnqkyn)). 
Let 
Clearly Pp is hyperarithmetic. Pp C w - A by 3.1 lA. w - A is not 
hyperarithmetic by 3.12A and 2.10. It follows that 
w - (A U P-) is infinite. 
Let P+ = Q+ U u (P,,“(m)+ u P,-“(m)+ I m < n). Pf C A by 3.11 A. 
Let P = (P+, P-). Then P is a coinfinite condition. P meets the following 
requirements for all sufficiently large a: 
Aa satisfies P, w - (A” U P-) is infinite, 
P f @, P k YnA(kB(a, n)), 
(m)nL<n[P3~4(~, 4 2 PI, 
W,,L&PF”(% 4 2 PI- 
By 3.7 yEA is undefined or >n for all sufficiently large CL. But then for 
all sufficiently large 01: if a: + 1 = I(mod 4) and P,/(L~, n) = @, then 
Y * = n and Pg”(a + 1, n) # @. a 
THEOREM 3.14. There exist two IIll sets, each generic with respect 
to all ranked sentences of 2u,(o;l), such that neither is Al1 in the other over 
recursive w, . 
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Proof. Let A and B be the III1 sets constructed above. Let Lemma 
3.nB (9 < n < 13) be the result of replacing B by A in Lemma 3.n”. 
By 3.12* and 3.12 B, A and B are generic with respect to all ranked 
sentences of Z&(67). F . ix n so that Y,;“(x) is a well-defined Zrl formula 
of P,,(n). We intend to show that w ~ B is not Z;l in A over recursive 
w1 via Y/(x). If’e will find a c such that 
The value of c depends on whether or not P/(tz) = #. 
Suppose P,“(n) f @. Let N be the unique 6 such that P/(8, n) = CD 
and 
(A > 8[p!gA(Y, ?Z) = PvA(,)l. 
Clearly, raA = II, P(E, n) E B, and PrqA(n) k $,/(F(o(, rz)). By 3.11~ 
A satisfies PrqA(n), so 
Thus the desired c is P(R, rz). 
Now suppose PTrA(n) = @. By 3.13”, we have 
But P(n) E w - B is a consequence of 3.9a. 
Similarly, w - A is not Zr’ in B over recursive w1 . 
COROLLARY 3.15. There exist two IIll sets szdz that Tzeither is 
q-computable from the other. 
Proof. 3.14, 2.10, and 2.ll(ii). 
4. EXTENSIONS 
Let 01 be an arbitrary admissible ordinal. Most of the notions of 
Section 2 generalize routinely from recursive wr to a. Let A and B be 
subsets of UI. Then A is l-computable from B means that A can be 
computed by means of Kripke’s equation calculus for 131 and computations 
of height less than lx. B is a-subgeneric means there is an m-recursive 
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procedure for replacing computations from B of height <a by a-finite 
computations from B. The projecturn of 01 (a concept due to Kripke) 
is the least g such that the range of some total a-recursive function is 
a subset of 6, and is denoted by 01*. Thus wi* = w. The arguments of 
Section 3 readily generalize to N’S such that LY* = w. 
THEOREM 4.1. Ifm* = w, then there exist two a-recursively enumerable 
subsets of w such that neither is a-computable from the other. 
Question 4.2. Can Theorem 4.1 be strengthened as follows ? 
If 01 is admissible then there exist two n-recursively enumerable 
subsets of N* such that neither is a-computable from the other. We 
conjecture that this last is true if 01 is countable, but we are completely 
at sea if a is uncountable. The countability of recursive wr was obviously 
important in the proof of 2.9, but we are not sure in just what way it was 
important. A routine generalization of 2.9 from recursive wi to a larger 
admissible u is successful if u* = w. It seems likely to us that a more 
imaginative generalization, something like MacIntyre’s construction [ 181 
of a minimal n-degree for each countable admissible 01, will succeed if 
01 is countable. But we have very little feeling for the case of uncountable 
‘1, because we don’t understand the meaning of the concept of count- 
ability within the domain of recursion theory. 
The proof of 4.1 includes a proof of 4.2. 
THEOREM 4.2. If  01* = W, then there exists a non-a-recursive, 
n-recursively enumerable, a-subgeneric subset of w. 
In order to prove 4.1 and 4.2, the language 5&,(F) is enlarged to 
2q.q; qq is a ramified set-theoretic language which includes 
numerals for all the ordinals less than a: and names for all the sets 
constructible (in the sense of Godel [19]) via the ordinals less than n. 
The metafinite, coinfinite forcing conditions of Section2 become a-finite. 
COROLLARY 4.3. There exists a Zz2’ subset of w which is generic with 
respect to every sentence of AZ1 ordinal rank. 
Proof. Let 6,l be the least non-d,’ ordinal. Then 6,l is admissible 
and (6,l)* = w. A subset of w is E&l-recursively enumerable if and only 
if it is Z,l [9, 201. 
The addition of some unappetizing complications results in the 
following relativizations of 3.6 and 3.15. 
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THEOREIVI 4.4. Let A be a nonhyperarithmetic flll set. There exist two 
II,’ sets, each of which is metarecursire in 24, neither of which is 
q-computable from the other. 
THEOREM 4.5. Let A be a nonhyperarithmetic IIll set. There exists 
a nonl?yperarithmetic, w,-subgeneric Ill’ set B metarecursk~e in A. 
Question 4.6. Which metadegrees are metadegrees of w,-subgeneric 
IIll sets ? 
This question is vaguely phrased but nonetheless sensible. By 2.5, 
if a 17,l set R is w,-subgeneric, then every 17,’ set of the same metadegree 
is w,-subgeneric. There does exist a non-w,-subgeneric II,’ set. Perhaps 
some Postian [21] condition on the complement of ,d leads to an 
improvement of 4.5 in which A is metarecursive in B i 
The metadegrees of the II,’ sets are still quite mysterious. It follows 
from the work of Driscoll [ 1 I], Owings [22] and Theorem 5 of [6] that 
the metadegrees of the fl,l sets form a dense partial ordering. Not much 
more than that is known. \$Te know very little about how to lift the 
following theorem of ordinary recursion theory [23] up into the 
metadegrees of the 17,’ sets: if A is a nonrecursive, recursively 
enumerable set, then A can be split into two disjoint recursively 
enumerable sets such that neither is recursive in the other. 
Question 4.7. I,et A be a non-hyperarithmetic L7,’ set. Can Ld be 
split into two disjoint flll sets such that neither is metarecursive in the 
other ? 
Owings has shown that if A is simple (touches every infinite fl,’ set), 
then A can be split as asked. Perhaps every w,-generic rl can be split. 
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